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FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT
ISSUES IN RELATION TO
ON-LINE LIABILITY
R. BRUCE RICH*
The advent of the Internet and the liability of on-line service
providers is the topic of this panel and has caused all of us to chal-
lenge, to expand, and, at least to some degree, to alter our tradi-
tional thoughts and perceptions of how we define the media.
These issues fundamentally implicate what role or roles we con-
ceive the media to play in our society.
What is it about the Internet, about the information which is
transmitted to our homes and offices through these on-line service
providers, that brings about this uncertainty and causes this very
healthy reflection? It is several attributes and phenomena.
At one level, the Internet provides enormous promise as proba-
bly the closest modern day analog to the town meeting, and the
truest democratic marketplace any of us could ever imagine.' It is
pluralistic in the extreme. Everybody has an equal voice. All
have equal access, at least those who can afford the fees of the on-
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1 For an informative collection of scholarly writings on the pivotal role of the First
Amendment in public debate, see generally DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA: A COLLEC-
TION OF ESSAYS (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990) (discussing free speech, libel and restrictions
on media communication); T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
miENT (1996) (focusing on fundamental right of free speech); A. MEnuEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GovRNMENT (1972) (exploring freedom of speech and its consti-
tutional implications).
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line service providers and the Internet access providers. It is
cacophonous and anarchic in many ways. There are very few
rules of the road. From a traditional First Amendment stand-
point, all one can say is positive. Speech on the Internet goes to
the roots and the heart of the First Amendment.2 In many ways, it
embodies our First Amendment ideals.3 Some of those very same
qualities (e.g., the wide and instantaneous dissemination of infor-
mation to often unknown audiences) create enormous fear and
concern in the public at large, in the government, and in the
courts.4
Diane Feinstein,5 and some other well meaning legislators,
have expressed the notion that bomb making manuals on the In-
ternet are terrible things,6 whereas, for better or worse, one can
find equivalent material, and have for years, in our book stores
and libraries. This raises the level of debate and alarm over the
First Amendment to a new, different, and troublesome level.
The very notion that someone can speak anonymously over this
medium raises alarm in some quarters-in the defamation area
and in other areas.' Privacy considerations are also implicated by
anonymous speech over the Internet.8
2 US CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
.... Id.
3 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The
essential meaning of the First Amendment has been eloquently described by Justice Bran-
deis as "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think." Id. Public discussion is, in
Justice Brandeis' words, "a fundamental principle of the American government." Id.
4 See, e.g., KENNETH C. CREECH, ELEcTRoNIc MEDIA LAw AND REGULATION 257 (1993)
(noting that use of computer networks has grown drastically in recent years).
5 See, e.g., Bill Stall & Tracy Wilkinson, California Gets Its First Woman State Senator,
L.A. Tmms, Nov. 4, 1992, at 1 (reporting Diane Feinstein's defeat of incumbent Republican
John Seymour, to become California's first female United States Senator).
6 See Internet Symposium: Legal Potholes Along the Information Superhighway, 16 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 541, 551 (1996) (discussing widespread fear about bomb-making information
disseminated on Internet); see also Eric B. Easton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie is
Out of the Bag: Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45
DEPAuL L. REv. 1, 42 (1995) (noting "mayhem manuals" are used on Internet to offer infor-
mation on building bombs).
7 See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993,
996-1014 (1994) (evaluating soundness of existing law for cyberspace). See generally David
Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and System Opera-
tor Liability, 12 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 109-11, 129-33 (1993) (examining computer informa-
tion systems and law concerning defamation and privacy).
8 See JOHN R. BrrrNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF ELEcTROmc MEDIA 153-54 (2d ed.
1994) (predicting increased litigation over privacy issues as result of ability to store secrets
on computers); see also CREECH, supra note 4, at 257 (warning network users not to trans-
mit information loosely unless intending data to be shared with public).
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I will discuss the implications of some of these concepts, specifi-
cally with respect to the evolving area of defamation law. What
one observes is that the schizophrenia with which people react to
the various attributes of this new medium also reflects itself in the
developing case law in the defamation field.
Many of you are familiar with the Cubby9 and Stratton
Oakmont10 cases. They essentially take very divergent views.
One could argue that the Cubby case took a fairly relaxed view, an
expansive view of the desirability of, loosely speaking, "letting it
all hang out" on this medium.
That is not to say that the speaker, per se, of defamatory re-
marks would not be held liable in a courtroom. Nothing in Cubby
says otherwise. What the decision says is that the transmitting
medium, fairly distant from the transaction and without realistic
control over it, ought not to be held answerable in the dock. 1
Therefore, one would argue from a broad First Amendment policy
standpoint that by limiting the liability of an on-line service pro-
vider in that situation, it encourages rather than discourages a
flow of discourse over this medium.
So at one philosophical level, Cubby is a good case from the
standpoint of "letting it all hang out" on the Internet, representing
a very expansive view of First Amendment interests. Then along
comes the Stratton Oakmont case, scrambling the deck quite sig-
nificantly and causing everybody to scratch their heads about
what signals one wants to send to an on-line service provider
which attempts to take at least modest steps-and I emphasize
9 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding in
favor of defendant on-line service provider in suit for defamation; reasoning defendant was
not "publisher" of information).
10 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995) (holding on-line service provider liable in action for libel; concluding com-
pany was 'publisher" by virtue of statements made on its electronic bulletin boards).
11 Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137. CompuServe is a computer network which provides an on-
line information service to its subscribers, with access to special interest forums, comprised
of electronic bulletin boards. Id. Cubby sued CompuServe for alleged defamatory state-
ments that appeared in CompuServe's on-line Journalism Forum. Id. at 138. Granting
summary judgment in favor of CompuServe, the District Court reasoned that the service
provider was a mere "distributor" for purposes of determining liability for the alleged defa-
mation. Id. at 135. Thus, the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to CompuServe
was whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory statements. Id. at
140-41.
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modest-in controlling what flows over its networks and over its
bulletin board services. 12
In Stratton Oakmont, we had a result arising out of modest ef-
forts on the part of the on-line service provider to exercise some
degree of control' 3 - far less, I would submit, than control one
normally associates with a traditional publisher, book, magazine,
or otherwise. This was not a case of taking a publication and se-
lecting works and editing and vetting those works. This was
software designed to catch a word or two, here or there, and some
efforts, however limited, through a moderator and other tech-
niques to sanitize some language-a far cry from traditional pub-
lisher-related activities. Nevertheless, the Stratton Oakmont
court says once an on-line service provider insinuates itself into
the process, it starts to look a little bit like a publisher and a
higher level of liability exists under the traditional New York
Times v. Sullivan14 standard. 15 This does not mean that the on-
line service provider will be held liable, but it means that it will
have a harder time avoiding and defending a defamation suit.
The prior panel discussed incrementalism and our tradition in
this country of evolving media through the years. 16 The broadcast
media had a traumatic experience dealing with speech concepts
during its own formative period.17 New technology's facilitation of
photocopying has been the subject of varying and disparate court
opinions and most recently has been evaluated in the Sixth Cir-
12 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. Stratton Oakmont held, for the first time,
that an on-line computer network can be sued for libel as if it were a newspaper, or other
publisher, because of the editorial control it exercises over its service. Id.
13 Id. at *2. Prodigy Services, the on-line provider, used a software screening program
which automatically prescreened posted messages for offensive language. Id. This ap-
proach was implemented in lieu of monitoring posted messages for content. Id.
14 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times and its progeny created the constitutional stan-
dard governing recoveries by libel plaintiffs against publishers of allegedly defamatory ma-
terial. See generally Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the
Horse Behind the Cart, 35 Am. U. L. REV. 3, 4 (1985). The author observes that New York
Times and its progeny "represent the Court's response to what it perceived as an alarming
increase in the frequency of defamation litigation instituted by public persons as well as in
the size of monetary sanctions and related expenses assessed against press defendants." Id.
15 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995).
16 See, e.g., Anthony L. Clapes, Proceed With Caution-Information Superhighway
Under Construction: Selecting the Proper Intellectual Property Rights Paradigm to Apply to
Passengers on the Internet, 11 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMtENT. 621 (1996); see also Lawrence
Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 635 (1996).
17 See, e.g., Kathryn S. Banashek, Can a Public Figure Win in a Libel Suit When the
Media Reported Truth? Defamation and False Impressions, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1009, 1015-20
(1991) (exploring clash between media and First Amendment regarding libel law).
[Vol. 11:665
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cuit's MDS18 opinion. Courts tend to struggle with hard concepts
implicated by new technology and new media. 19 The difference
with cyberspace technology is that under the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996,20 Congress, with a stroke of its pen, has taken a
significant step towards undoing the implications of the Stratton
Oakmont case by, in essence, saying that if you are not the origi-
nator of the content, if you are not the creator, but you are merely
the pipe through which it flows, then you are not to be treated for
purposes of defamation (or any other tort doctrine, for that mat-
ter) as a publisher or as a speaker.21 In essence, the Cubby kind of
approach has been legislated.
I will leave to others to determine whether this is good or bad
public policy to race to this kind of legislative solution in the rela-
tive infancy of this type of media. This is an interesting and
rather quick fix viewed against our traditional means for dealing
with and sorting through these difficult kinds of media-related
issues.
It is notable that the very same provision that I just referred
to 22 also has a fascinating safe harbor, going beyond what I just
mentioned. It says that:
No provider or user of interactive computer services shall be
held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively vi-
olent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected.23
It is debatable whether, in terms of public policy, it is desirable
for Congress to push private parties, such as on-line service prov-
iders, in the direction of actively policing speech on this medium.
18 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
19 Compare United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (defendants sub-
ject to liability in state where guilty of violating such state's obscenity law via electronic
bulletin board) with CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1257 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (on-line
service provider not necessarily liable in state where services provided).
20 Included as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 104, 110
Stat. 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
21 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223). This
provision requires 'knowingly making, creating, or soliciting obscene information" as a pre-
requisite to tort liability. Id.
22 Id. (requiring Internet access providers to screen, rather than eliminate, indecent
material).
23 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c).
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I believe reasonable points of view can vary. It is a fascinating
concept; we are not here to resolve it today so much as raise it, but
it is fascinating to think about the implications of this kind of
tinkering with the speech system.
There are many unresolved and fascinating questions yet to be
determined in the application of defamation law principles to on-
line service providers, such as the application of the general con-
cept of public versus private figures with respect to the Internet.24
This is a significant distinction in defamation law.2 5 What does
this distinction mean in the context where everybody has instan-
taneous access to the medium to respond to an attack on one's rep-
utation; where again, one can do so fairly instantaneously and rel-
atively, if not completely, to the same audience? What does this
do to traditional notions of two tiers of defamation recovery in our
society?26
What about opinion and fact distinctions which are terribly im-
portant in the area of Constitutional law? The courts, as you
know, look to the context in which statements are made to deter-
mine whether they have a literal meaning to them, whether their
sting is meant to be literal as opposed to reflecting opinion. In a
24 See CREECH, supra note 4, at 258 (recognizing that as scientific technology progresses
so must related law and regulatory activity); see also MARTIN LONDON & BARBARA DILL, AT
WHAT PRICE? LIBEL LAW AND FREEDOM OF THE PREss 70 (1993) (pointing out that there is
disagreement over which new issues involving libel law must be tackled).
25 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding public
figures or officials, unlike private plaintiffs, must prove "actual malice" to prevail on defa-
mation claims); see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986)
(deciding private figure plaintiffs alleging defamation have burden of proving falsity of me-
dia defendant's speech on matter of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S.
323, 351 (1974) (refusing to extend New York Times standard to defamation of private indi-
viduals). See generally M. Linda Dragas, Curing a Bad Reputation: Reforming Defamation
Law, 17 U. HAw. L. REv. 113, 127-28 (1995) (explaining that contemporary Supreme Court
defamation cases look to whether plaintiff is public official or private figure and to whether
statement in question is public versus private issue).
26 See Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1657, 1678-79 (1987) (proposing defamatory speech should invoke "actual malice" standard
while content and status should be considered in determining if less demanding standard
should apply); see also Arlen W. Languardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommo-
dating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the
Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 903, 963 (1989) (describing "two-tiered" ap-
proach of defamation law as governing some cases by "actual malice" standard and others
by "negligence-fault" standard).
27 In Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, (1974), the Supreme Court, in dictum, stated
that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." Id. at 339. This
language encouraged courts for a number of years to draw a constitutional distinction be-
tween fact and opinion.
Thereafter in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 18 (1990), the Court stated that
it did not believe "Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for any-
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computer bulletin board setting, are we closer to a letter to the
editor or closer to an opinion column in a newspaper? Where on
the fact/opinion spectrum is speech on the Internet going to lie? I
believe we will witness a mix of judicial reaction.
I believe in all of these arenas, out of fear, and frankly out of
lack of knowledge about how this medium will develop, there will
be both good and bad opinions from the courts and there will be
both good and bad federal and state legislation as well. We all
need to stay tuned.
thing that may not be labeled opinion." Id. "Not only would such an interpretation be con-
trary to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expres-
sions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of objective fact." Id. The opinion area today
remains a murky one, lending itself to case-by-case determination. Id.
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